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1. 2005–2006 was a critical period in the development of the nuclear complexes of 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. These years have ushered in a “nuclear 
renaissance”. Russia’s nuclear sector was subject to a total systemic review; the Federal Target 
Program (FTP) allocated to it funds totaling more than USD 55 billion. A decision was taken to 
consolidate all nuclear assets within one state corporation. Kazakhstan implemented the “15000 
tons uranium by 2010” state development program. Its development programs for reactors and 
nuclear power plants are worked out jointly with Russia. Closer cooperation is also being pursued 
with other leaders in the field, primarily Japanese companies. Cooperation agreements between 
the two countries were adopted. The foundation of three joint ventures (JV) was the first tangible 
outcome of above agreements. 
2. Meanwhile Kazakh uranium has become a focus of attention and fierce competition between 
the world’s largest consumers, including France, Canada, USA, Japan, China, South Korea, 
and Russia. Early this decade, Russia’s substantial production capacity and highly competitive 
uranium ore conversion technologies added to calls for the country to renew its economic links 
with Kazakhstan in the uranium mining and nuclear industries. Given Russia’s ambitious plans to 
develop nuclear energy, and the fact that its uranium stocks are practically depleted, the benefits 
of closer cooperation with Kazakhstan are clear. However, Russia will have to compete with 
well-established players on Kazakhstan’s uranium market.
3. Kazakhstan has aspirations to become a world leader in uranium mining and to focus 
production at the highly processed end of the nuclear fuel cycle. This was the backdrop for a recent 
transaction which will have a significant impact on the country’s nuclear industry. In the autumn 
of 2007, KazAtomProm purchased Toshiba’s 10% share in Westinghouse Electrics, a leading 
producer of nuclear reactors, for USD 540 million. This transaction has secured a permanent 
nuclear alliance between KazAtomProm, Toshiba and Westinghouse Electrics. For Kazakhstan, 
this creates new opportunities to develop a hi-tech nuclear industry and to market its output in the 
West. Supplying high-end nuclear products to Western markets is one of KazAtomProm’s 
development priorities, along with continued cooperation with Russia in supplying Soviet-
type reactors. 
4. The need to integrate the nuclear power complexes of Kazakhstan and Russia along the 
entire production chain is a logical response to their urgent need to reduce their energy deficit, and 
to the synergies which exist between their production capacities and technologies at each stage 
of the nuclear fuel production chain: (1) uranium mining, (2) uranium enrichment, (3) production 
of fuel pellets and fuel elements, (4) reactor design and production, primarily 300 MW VBER-300 
power reactors, (5) construction and operation of nuclear power plants, and (6) nuclear waste 
processing and disposal.
5. Kazakhstan has plans to develop its own nuclear power industry and is likely to base this on 300 
MW Russian-Kazakh reactors and, in the longer-term, 1000 MW Westinghouse reactors. 
6. The development of this capital-intensive sector will require extensive financing based on credit 
from a number of sources. International and national development banks are one promising 
potential source of such funding. The ability to secure this capital from international and 
national development banks rests entirely upon the nuclear energy industry’s potential for 
development, innovation, diversification and integration. The Eurasian Development Bank, VEB 
(Russian Development Bank) and the Development Bank of Kazakhstan have indicated their 
recognition of this. E.g., the EDB has extended credit to the Russian-Kazakh Zarechnoye JV.
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Nuclear power plants generate every sixth kilowatt of electricity produced in the world. 
Nuclear is third largest source of energy after coal (39%) and hydro energy (19%). Today 440 
nuclear reactors in 31 countries generate a total 370 GW, which is double Russia’s thermal and 
electric energy output. 
Canada, Australia, South Africa and Kazakhstan are the world’s major suppliers of natural uranium. 
Russia has almost no uranium production but generates uranium under the warheads disposal 
program. 
Russia’s TekhSnabExport, USEC of America, AREVA of France and the Anglo-German company 
Urenco are leaders in uranium enrichment. 
Moreover, Russia has a 20% per cent share in the fuel elements market, specifically fuel pellets 
for reactors. It is a leading builder of nuclear reactors, alongside America’s General Electric and 
Westinghouse, AREVA of France and the Franco-German company Siemens-Framatom. 
In 2005–2006, nuclear energy sector saw a global renaissance. After two decades of 
environmental protest and most projects being frozen in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident in the USSR and Three Mile Island in the USA, many countries are set to increase the 
share of nuclear energy in their national power supply. The safety and economic viability of this 
form of energy at a time of record high and still rising hydrocarbon prices have played a significant 
role in decision-making process. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has predicted that there will be a 53% increase in global ener- 
gy consumption by 2030. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the cost 
of nuclear energy development will exceed USD 200 billion by 2030. Finland, Switzerland, Spain, 
India and the USA have specific plans to ramp up their nuclear capacity. Vietnam, Egypt and Turkey 
are considering building nuclear power plants. Ambitious plans for the construction of nuclear 
power plants may be introduced in South Korea, China and Japan and it is evident that developing 
Asian economies will be responsible for considerable growth in the nuclear energy sector. 
AREVA has estimated that some 500 nuclear reactors will be commissioned by 2030 (20 new 
reactors annually). The expansion of nuclear capacity will be curtailed to some extent by the 
relatively small number of companies capable of building the reactors. Given the predicted rate of 
growth, the concept of competition between companies may prove to be redundant. At a conference 
on International Cooperation in NPP Construction Projects held in Moscow in late October 2006, 
representatives of Westinghouse, a nuclear reactor producer which controls 25% of the market, 
emphasized that a shortage of engineering capacity was a major problem. The company has 
Graph 1. Nuclear’s 
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received six orders for new AP-100 reactors, which takes Westinghouse to the limit of its existing 
capacity. AREVA also has a full order book and plans to build five nuclear reactors by 2010.
The leading consultancy firm, Ux Consulting, has predicted that global uranium mining and 
consumption are set to increase dramatically (see tables 1 and 2). Significant growth is expected 
in Kazakhstan and Russia. However, Russia ranks third in terms of uranium stocks, and since 
deposits are hard to access, will have to make huge investments in order to develop uranium 
mining. 
2005 2010 2015 Average 
annual rowth, 
2005–2015, %
Canada 13713 16500 21772 4,7
Kazakhstan 5144 14800 19200 14,1
Russia 3921 6400 8000 7,4
Africa 8154 12445 12645 4,5
Australia 11222 10874 16654 4,0
other 7123 8943 8122 1,3
Total recovery: 49277 69962 86393 5,8
HEU supply1 7258 9072  - -
Other recoverable 
resources
18733 13744 11703 -4.6
Total supply 75267 92778 98096 2,7
Table 1. Global Uranium 
Recovery, 2005–2015, t.
Source: Uranium Market 
Outlook. Ux Consulting, 2007
2005 2010 2015 2030
USA 24765 25086 25923 30916
Canada 2118 1931 1931 2370
EU 27195 24593 24156 19376
Japan 9651 9908 13084 16940
South Korea 3551 4247 5910 7983
Taiwan 1126 2211 1562 1593
Russian Federation 4020 6880 8069 10427
China 1594 3378 3806 15771
India 414 474 1229 4177
Worldwide consumption: 78818 84786 91719 117193
 1 HEU – highly enriched uranium  
Table 2. Largest Uranium 
Consumers, 2005–2030, t.
Source: Uranium Market 
Outlook. Ux Consulting, 2007
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Kazakhstan: On the Way to No.1 Uranium Producer,  
Striving to Add Value
There are a number of factors prompting Kazakhstan to develop its nuclear energy sector: 
• The country’s generating capacity is rapidly ageing. By 2012-2014, production capacity will be 
80-90% obsolete, compared to 60-70% currently. 
• Generating capacity is poorly diversified. Over 80% of all electricity is produced by combined 
heat-and-power (HPP) plants. The sustainability of Kazakhstan’s grid would be improved if more 
generating capacity was built in southern and western parts of the country.
• The production and consumption of electricity are geographically too divided. The largest 
generating capacity is in Pavlodar Oblast in the north of Kazakhstan, whereas core consumption 
is in the south. The annual rate of growth of electricity consumption in southern Kazakhstan is 
12-13% compared to 6-7% for the country as a whole. To avert a widening of energy deficit in 
the south, an extra plant needs to be built. The Balkhash power plant is one planned way of 
spreading energy production more evenly across the country2. 
• The growth in electricity consumption is outstripping the rate of supply increase in western 
Kazakhstan (the Mangistau and Atyrau oblasts). 
• Constructing new capacity in southern and western Kazakhstan will allow the country to 
increase its energy exports to Russia. Currently, energy exports are generated mostly in northern 
Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan’s ambitious plans to expanding nuclear power generation reflect Kazakhstan’s desire 
to forge ahead in world energy markets and to avoid a force-majeure situation in the domestic 
energy market. Kazakhstan is at risk of changing from an energy-abundant country into one with a 
significant energy deficit. Against an annual rate of growth in GDP of 9%, the average annual rate 
of energy consumption stands at 6%. There are 71 power plants in the country, half of them built 
before 1980. The maximum generation capacity of these plants is currently below 73 billion kilowatt 
hours, yet annual energy consumption is predicted to reach 74 billion kilowatt hours by 2008. 
The uneven development of the national grid has exacerbated the situation. Major generating 
capacities are located in the northern part of the country. Three oblasts – Pavlodar, Karaganda and 
East Kazakhstan – account for over 70% of total power generated, but power loss in transit amounts 
to 20% of the total, on average. The construction of small- and medium-capacity power plants is 
one way of reducing power loss and geographical inequality. The greater the distance between 
generating capacity and feedstock supply, the lower the cost effectiveness of the power plant; it is 
very costly to transport coal across the entire country or to lay a dedicated gas pipeline. 
Developing hydro-electric generation in some Kazakh regions will not be a significant factor in 
reducing the energy deficit. Nuclear power plants are a more effective solution to this since nuclear 
reactors are refueled every five years. Also, Kazakhstan is able to supply nuclear fuel for all its 
domestic requirements. According to KazAtomProm’s president, Mr. M. Dzhakishev, a new nuclear 
power plant should be ready for commissioning in 2014–2015. The design and feasibility study for 
the plant will take three years, and its construction will take a further five years.
Russia: Breaking the “Infrastructural Bottleneck”
The development of nuclear energy in Russia is particularly expedient for the following reasons:
2 Earlier discussions have envisaged construction of a 2 GW NPP on Balkhash but final decision has been taken in 2008 in favor of an HPP (600x4 MW)  
on Ekibastuz coal  
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1. Russia’s anticipated near-term energy deficit is a major “infrastructural bottleneck”.
2. The development of nuclear energy will allow for further growth in gas exports.
Russia’s existing technological capacity and the fact that energy deficits may soon become (have 
already become in some regions) a major infrastructural barrier to economic development, make 
the development of nuclear power in the country a particularly urgent priority. In addition, there 
is significant potential for Russia to increase gas exports if nuclear plays a larger role in domestic 
energy supply. 
Nuclear energy capacity is currently exploited to its maximum limit. Current feedstock reserves are 
only sufficient to supply existing generating capacity. In Russia the ratio of reserves to capacity 
is just over 70%, compared to the average European level of 83-85%. Large-scale investment is 
required to increase this ratio. It is expected that up to USD 10 billion will be invested in a program 
to extend uranium mining; 60-70% of Russia’s uranium needs will be met domestically and 30-
40% by uranium mined by joint ventures in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and other states. 
Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Energy Development
The relatively limited environmental impact of nuclear energy is another factor favoring NPP 
development in Russia and Kazakhstan. It is a more important factor for Kazakhstan than for 
Russia, since Kazakhstan’s existing domestic generating structure means that over 80% of its 
energy is produced in combined heat and power plants. 
According to statistics from the AES Сorporation, it costs USD 800 for each new kilowatt hour 
of generating capacity from a co-generation plant compared to $1600-$1800 for each new kW 
of nuclear capacity (preliminary estimates for the Russian-Kazakh VBER-300 reactor are around 
$1000-$1200. However, both estimates were subject to high inflation over the last years. Our 
current estimates are in the range of $2000-3000/kW, depending on the type and location). 
However, it is a lot cheaper to operate a nuclear power plant and the environmental cost is also 
smaller. Generating 1 gigawatt hour in a coal-fired plant produces 766 tonnes of carbon dioxide, 
compared to 3 tonnes from a NPP (Table 3). 
Nuclear plants are regarded as one of cleanest sources of energy. The economic indicators of 
nuclear plants bear comparison with fossil fuel plants. As an illustration, the operating parameters 
of 4,000 MW co-generation and nuclear power plants are given below (the table shows typical data 
for the USSR).
Table 3. Quantitative 
Indicators for Operating 4,000 
MW coal-fired HPP and Nuclear 
Power Plants 
Source: T. Zhantikin, A. Bladov, 
S. Koltyshev (2005), Report. 
Nuclear Energy Development 
in the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
See also Appendix 4. 
Note: Fuel consumption is expressed 
in conventional fuel tonnes; the actual 
quantity of fuel consumed depends on 
its calorific value and varies  
for coal, depending on grade,  
by 15-20 MM t/y.
Description Quantity (t/y)
CHP NPP
Fuel consumption * 12 000000 4
Atmospheric oxygen intake 32 000 000 0
Carbon dioxide waste 36 000 000 0
Sulphur dioxide waste  800 000 0
Nitrogen oxide waste  400 000 0
Solid wastes 8 000 000 200
Particulate emissions 400 000 0
Environmental heat discharge 
capacity, MW 
6 000 8 000
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Picture 2. Russia’s Operating NPPs   
NPP Name Unit # Reactor 
Type
MW, gross Power Unit 
Generation
Operation End of Service 
Life, yr
Beloyarsk 3 BN600 600 II 1980 2010–2020**
Bilibinsk 1
2
3
4
EGP-6
EGP-6
EGP-6
EGP-6
12
12
12
12
I
I
I
I
1974
1974
1975
1976
2004–2014**
2004–2014**
2005–2015**
2006–2016**
Balakov 1
2
3
4
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
II
II
II
III
1985
1987
1988
1993
2015
2017
2018
2023
Kalinin 1
2
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
1000
1000
II
II
1984
1986
2014
2016
Kolsk 1
2
3
4
VVER-440
VVER-440
VVER-440
VVER-440
440
440
440
440
I
I
II
II
1973
1974
1981
1984
2003–2013**
2004–2014**
2011
2014
Kursk 1
2
3
4
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
I
II
III
IV
1976
1979
1983
1985
2006–2016**
2009–2019**
2013
2015
Leningrad 1
2
3
4
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
I
II
III
IV
1973
1975
1979
1981
2003–2013**
2005–2020**
2009–2019**
2011
Novovoronezhsk 3
4
5
VVER-440
VVER-440
VVER-1000
417
417
1000
I
I
II
1971
1972
1980
2001–2011**
2002–2012**
2010
Smolensk 1
2
3
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
RBMK-1000
1000
1000
1000
II
II
II
1982
1985
1990
2012
2015
2020
Table 4. 
Description of 
Operating NPPs 
* First and second 
generating units 
of above NPP have 
been shutdown for 
decommissioning 
** A 10 year extension 
of service life taken into 
account
St. Petersburg
Smolensk
Kursk
Voronezh
Tver
Rostov-on-Don
Saratov
Yekaterinburg
Murmansk
Polar circle
MOSCOW
Rostov NPP
VVER-1000 – 1 unit
Novovoronezh NPP
VVER-440 – 2 units
VVER-1000 – 1 unit
Kursk NPP
RBMK-1000 – 4 units
Smolensk NPP
RBMK-1000 – 3 units
Kalinin NPP
VVER-1000 –2 units
Leningrad NPP
RBMK-1000 – 4 units
Kolsk NPP
VVER-440 –2 units
Bilibinsk NPP
EGP-6 – 4 units
Beloyarsk NPP
BN-600 – 1 unit
Balakov NPP
VVER-1000 – 4 units
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Crucial 200
2006 was a crucial year for the Russian nuclear industry. Reforms were introduced throughout the 
industry in that year, and the attitude of the Russian authorities and the public towards nuclear 
industry changed. V. Gagiyev, General Director of Russia’s Union of Nuclear, Energy and Scientific 
Industry Employers, described some of more notable achievements of Russia’s nuclear industry 
in 2006:
• The regulatory framework for nuclear industry reform was established. The Government of 
Russian Federation approved a Federal Target Program (FTP), entitled “The Development of 
Russia’s Nuclear and Energy Complex in 2007–2010 and Potential Development to 2015”. In 
2007, a Federal Law on “Management and Disposal of Property and Assets of Organizations 
Active in the Nuclear Energy Sector and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Russian 
Federation” was adopted. 
• In 2006, work began on the construction of a fourth generating unit at the Beloyarsk BN-800 
fast-neutron reactor nuclear power plant. Construction work began on a fourth generating unit 
began at the Kalinin NPP, and on the first offshore KLT-40S ice-breaker reactor.
• In 2006, Russian nuclear engineers bid successfully for the contract to build the Belene nuclear 
power plant in Bulgaria, the first post-Soviet nuclear construction project in Europe to be 
awarded to Russian engineers. The contract was awarded to AtomStroyExport, which is also 
building five generating units at nuclear plants in China, India and Iran.
• Zarechnoye, the Russian-Kazakh JV, began mining uranium and has planned capacity of 1000t/
y U. Russia’s first overseas uranium mining project is financed by a five-year, USD 63 million 
loan from the Eurasian Development Bank
• Kazakh uranium will be enriched at a dedicated site at the Angarsk Electro-chemical Complex.
• TVEL Corporation expanded its exports of nuclear fuel, bidding successfully to supply the 
Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic.
• Joint ventures were established with engineering companies producing equipment for nuclear 
power plants. Social progress was made, too. 
• Finally, public attitudes towards the nuclear power industry changed radically; the sector 
regained its priority status3. 
FTP “Development of Russia’s Nuclear Power Complex  
in 2007–2010 and Potential Development to 2015”
On October 4, 2006, the Government of Russian Federation approved the Federal Target Program 
entitled “The Development of Russia’s Nuclear Energy Complex in 2007–2010 and Potential 
Development to 2015”.4  The program establishes the timetable for the startup of new nuclear 
power generation units serving the ‘hotspots’ of Russian economic growth (Moscow Oblast, 
European Russia, Russia’s Far East and the Urals). It envisages that ten new generating units with a 
total capacity of over 11 gigawatts will be commissioned by 2015. Today, ten nuclear power plants 
are operating in Russia and these have a total output of 23.3 gigawatts; nuclear power accounts 
for 15.5% of Russia’s total power generation. As a result of this FTP, nuclear’s share of total power 
generation will increase to 22% according to the baseline scenario, and up to 30% according to 
the optimistic scenario. 
Overall funding for the program totals 1.47 trillion rubles (USD 55 billion), including 674.8 billion 
rubles from the federal budget and 796.6 billion rubles from the industry. It is assumed that the 
nuclear power industry will not require central funding after 2015 since the foundations built over 
the next eight years are designed to ensure the industry becomes self-financing. The unit cost of 
nuclear power plant construction is expected to fall by 10% and the net cost of power generation 
by 20%. 
3 http://www.rosatom.ru/comments/3437_16.01.2007, as at October 2007
4 http://www.government.gov.ru/government/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentplans/8123133.htm, as at October 2007
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Due to the insufficient funding of a previous project, the “The Safety and Development of the 
Nuclear Power Industry”, which received only 70.6% of its planned budget, the Federal Target 
Program “Energy Effective Economy for 2002–2005 and Potential Development until 2010” is 
behind schedule. Only two generating units were commissioned, adding two gigawatts of new 
capacity, out of a planned three new units which were due to bring on stream three gigawatts of 
new generating capacity.
The government-approved FTP does not concern itself with RosAtomProm’s development. The 
industry’s organizational development is addressed in the Federal Law on the Management and 
Disposal of the Property and Assets of Organizations Active in the Nuclear Energy Sector, which 
came into force on February 20, 2007.5  The main premise of this law is to consolidate nuclear assets 
in a single corporation, i.e., AtomEnergoProm. The corporation will control the entire nuclear energy 
production chain, including uranium mining, power and fuel production, domestic and overseas 
power plant construction, nuclear machine building, and design and research organizations6. 
AtomEnergoProm’s assets are estimated at USD 40-50 billion.
In the second half of 2007, the decision was taken to consolidate nuclear assets in the state firm 
RosAtom. This company will comprise the industry’s scientific base, nuclear safety facilities and 
100% of the assets of AtomEnergoProm, which, in turn, will manage all the civic entities within the 
nuclear industry. The relevant draft law was passed by State Duma by the end of 2007. 
Finally, in April 2007, Russia began constructing the first offshore nuclear power plant in the world. 
The 70 MW plant is scheduled for completion by 2010. Its output will mainly be consumed by 
Sevmash, and around 20% will be sold. Project costs stand at USD 200 million. The investment 
will pay for itself in less than seven years. A total of seven offshore nuclear power plants, including 
high-capacity plants, are due to be commissioned by 2016. Offshore nuclear power plants may be 
positioned in any coastal area to generate power and heat and also to desalinate sea water. These 
plants are considered safer and have a re-fuelling interval of 12-15 years.
A Swing of Public Opinion  
Public opinion towards nuclear power in Russia is changing, and attitudes are becoming more 
positive. In a survey, 45% of respondents answered “yes” to the question, “Do you think new 
nuclear power plants or nuclear generating units should be constructed in Russia?”; 
28% said “no” and 27% gave no answer.
 Those who supported nuclear expansion gave the following reasons. “They are more environmentally 
friendly than fossil fuel heat-and-power plants and hydro-electricity plants”; “Nuclear power has no 
cheaper alternative as yet”; “Wind power is still a ‘futuristic’ option”; “Nearly all Western countries 
rely on nuclear power whereas we produce only 12% of our energy in nuclear power plants”; “It is 
inevitable given current energy demand”; “Natural resources have limits; sooner or later oil and 
gas will run out”; “Nuclear power is the future, whether we like it or not”.7 
5 Federal Law on Factors for Management and Disposal of Property and Assets of Organizations Operating to Use Nuclear Energy as of February 5, 2007. 
  Rossiyskaya Gazeta, #4291 of February 9, 2007.
6 http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=40957&idChannel=73 as of June 2007.
7 http://www.rosatom.ru/news/3348_09.01.2007 as of October 2007.
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KazAtomProm after the Year 2000
In 2006, KazAtomProm’s position in world markets supplying the nuclear power industry was as 
follows:
- It supplied 8% of the world’s mined uranium, putting KazAtomProm in fourth place in the world 
compared to 16th place in 1999;
- It supplied 29% of the world’s beryllium products (3% in 1999), putting it in second place 
globally; 
- It supplied 8% of all tantalum products (0.4% in 1999) and was fourth in the world. 
After a long crisis in the world’s uranium industry, KazAtomProm commissioned three new mines: 
South Moinkum, South Karamurun and Akdala. 
In 2002, the High-Technology Institute was founded to conduct scientific follow up on 
KazAtomProm’s projects. 
In 2003, KazAtomProm purchased, by tender, the former Mangistau Nuclear Power Plant and 
established the MAEK-KazAtomProm company.
In 2004, management of the Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine (Tselinny Mining & 
Chemical Co.) was handed over to KazAtomProm. 
Today, the KazAtomProm holding manages six areas of activity: geological exploration; uranium 
mining; metallurgical engineering; energy; scientific support for production and staff training; 
and social security. KazAtomProm owns shares in several uranium mining joint ventures: KatCo 
(with French company Cogema/Areva); Inkai (with Canadian company Kameko); Zarechnoye (with 
Russian TekhSnabExport): and UKR TVS (producing nuclear fuel with Russian-Ukrainian partners).
In 2004, KazAtomProm highlighted the global uranium production crisis. Company experts 
suggested that the global uranium shortage would grow to 16,000 tonnes in six years. By 2010, 
KazAtomProm plans to produce 15,000 tU, making it a leading player in the world’s industry. Its 
confident predictions are based on the solid commercial relationships it has forged with the world’s 
largest energy and commercial companies, and upon its financial stability, advanced scientific 
knowledge base and a strong network of peer enterprises.8  
The company’s management estimates that Kazakhstan’s uranium stocks amount to around 
900,000 tonnes.
Program “15 000 tU by 2010”
Having identified growing world demand and hence competition for uranium fuel, KazAtomProm 
drafted its “1500 tU by 2010” development program. If the program is implemented successfully 
KazAtomProm will become a world leader on the uranium market.
The Program includes: 
1. Upgrading and extending uranium extraction and production of uranium fuel.
2. Constructing and commissioning new mines.
3. Constructing and optimizing power distribution, and new road and rail infrastructure
4. Financial reorganization.
5. Uranium extraction will increase to a planned 15 000 tU to meet increasing demand for uranium 
fuel.
8 http://www.KazAtomProm.kz/cgi-bin/index.cgi?p8&version=ru as at October 2007
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Mines 2005 2006 2007P 2008P 2009P 2010P Planned 
Capacity
Uvanaz 420 300 300 300 300 300 300
East Kynkuduk 633 500 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Central Mynkuduk - - 200 600 1200 2000 2000
Akdala (JV, Canada) 726 700 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
South Inkai  
(JV, Canada)
176 308 508 300 1970 2000 2000
Inkai - - 100 300 600 1000 2000
Kanzhygan 440 400 400 400 400 400 400
West Mynkuduk 
(JV, Japan)
- - - 100 300 600 1000
Budenovskoe  
(JV, Russia)
- - - 100 300 600 1000
South Moinkum 502 500 500 500 500 500 500
Moinkum  
(JV, France)
39 400 500 500 500 500 500
Tortkuduk  
(JV, France)
- 100 350 750 900 1000 1000
North Karamurun 700 750 800 980 980 1000 1000
South Karamurun 214 200 200 150 250 250 250
Irkol (JV, Japan) - - 100 250 500 750 750
Kharasan  
(JV, Canada)
- - 100 300 600 1000 2000
Zarechnoye  
(JV, Russia)
- 250 500 500 1000 1000 1000
SMCC mines 507 525 545 645 815 450 500
Total: 4357 4933 7103 8675 13115 15350  18200
Table 5. Uranium 
Recovery by Mine
Source: 
KazAtomProm
Note: according to 
preliminary data, 
KazAtomProm produced 
6637t U in 2007. The 
production target for 
2008 is 9600t U. The 
2007 data for mines is 
as follows: 0.6 million 
pounds at Inkai; 871t at 
South Moinkum; 300t 
at Irkol in 2008, 500t 
in 2009 and 750t in 
2010, and 0.5 million 
pounds planned for 
South Inkai in 2008 
(Ux Consulting, January 
2008). Zarechnoye has 
produced 100 tU in 
2007 but is expected 
to see substantial 
increase in 2008.
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Program’s Investment Needs  
KazAtomProm requires USD 700 million in order to implement the “15 000t U by 2010” program. 
The program’s financial sources were initially identified as follows:
1. KazAtomProm’s own funds: USD 170 million;
2. Uranium pre-payments: USD 220 million;
3. Bank loans: USD 210 million;
4. Eurobonds: USD 100 million.
Later in September 2005, a more precise estimate for the program was announced, totaling 
USD 660 million. By then, KazAtomProm had already raised USD 210 million in loans and USD 
60 million in pre-payments for uranium; the company’s own contribution will eventually total 
USD 224 million. It is expected that the remaining USD 166 million will be raised by a Eurobond 
issue.9  
Given Kazakhstan’s success to date in raising funds there seems little reason to doubt that the 
company will raise the full amount required to fund its program. The national company enjoys 
credit ratings at the sovereign level for Kazakhstan.
The Development of Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Complex  
in 2000–200
In mid-June 2001, KazAtomProm’s President, M. Dzhakishev, stated that Kazakhstan could become 
a world leader in the world’s uranium market within ten years.10 Uranium prices had slumped in 
recent years, he said, after the market was flooded with military uranium after the end of the cold 
war. These stocks, however, would run out some time between 2005 and 2008, and prices would 
increase rapidly, making uranium effectively ’priceless’ by 2010, in that there would be “no uranium 
at any price”. His estimate was based on the development targeted by the nuclear states.
In 2002, the Kazakh government published its “Development Strategy for the Uranium and Nuclear 
Energy Industries 2002–203011. The plan was conceived to transform the country’s nuclear energy 
complex into a hi-tech, dynamic and progressive sector that would be the keystone of vigorous and 
sustainable economic development. It emerged as the result of KazAtomProm’s crisis management 
and in response to the rapid growth of the Kazakh economy.
The strategy targeted production of 15,000t/y U by 2028, which would make Kazakhstan the world’s 
largest producer. To implement the project would cost USD 540 million. The uranium produced 
would be worth USD 82-85 million annually, and the national budget would receive USD 2 billion 
annually in tax revenues. 
In 2004, the Uranium Industry Development Strategy for the Republic of Kazakhstan 2004–2015 
was approved.
In recent years, the company has been increasing uranium extraction. In 2002, KazAtomProm 
was the fourth largest uranium producer in the world (accounting for 8% of global uranium ore 
production), according to statistics from the World Nuclear Association. Uranium production 
volumes were increased by revamping old mines (Uvanas, East Mynkuduk, Kanzhugam, South 
Moinkum, North Karamurun) and exploiting new deposits (South Karamurun and South Moinkum). 
Further increases in uranium production would be achieved by developing deposits which had 
been discovered but which had not, up to now, been exploited (Zarechnoye, Ilpak, Irkol, Central 
Mynkuduk, Budenovskoye and part of the Inkai deposit which was estimated to contain 473,000 
tonnes uranium). In pursuit of its goals, KazAtomProm increased uranium production from 794 
tonnes in 1998 to 2,850 tonnes in 2002. In 2003, Kazakhstan increased uranium recovery to 
2,952 tonnes. In 2004, Kazakhstan produced 3,719 tonnes uranium and became the third largest 
9 To implement the program “15000 tU by 2010”, Kazakhstan will require $660 Million”. M. Dzhakishev. Kazakhstan today. September 14, 2005. 
10 7 Kazakhstan may become a leader in the world’s uranium trade. Kazakhstan today. June 18, 2001.
11 Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan #926 of August 20, 2002.
1 E. Vinokurov “Nuclear Energy Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan: Prospects for Development and Cooperation”. © Eurasian Development Bank 
producer in the world. Interim data estimates uranium production in 2005 totaling 4,300 tonnes. 
This rapid production growth prompted KazAtomProm to issue more optimistic forecasts. In March 
2005, the company announced its development strategy aimed at increasing uranium recovery to 
15,000t/y U by 2010, making Kazakhstan the world’s top producer. 
To achieve this ambitious growth rate, the company pursued radical measures to rehabilitate and 
develop Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. As well as revamping its infrastructure, KazAtomProm 
expanded by acquiring nuclear enterprises. In late April 2003, the Mangyshlak Nuclear Power Plant, 
which had been placed in bankruptcy a month before, was sold to KazAtomProm for USD 800,000. 
The plant was a strategic enterprise engaged in the entire production cycle, supplying constant 
heat and power from a safe reactor. The new company, MAEK-KazAtomProm, was registered on 
May 1, 2003.
Competition for Kazakh Uranium
Kazakh uranium is becoming the focus of fierce competition between the world’s large 
consumers, primarily France, Canada, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia. External 
investors are poised to “conquer” the market through direct investment, loans and trade funding 
to guarantee supply. In such circumstances, KazAtomProm has no worries about raising capital.
In late September 2004, KazAtomProm and Kazsabton Ltd. (Cyprus) signed a contract placing 
Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Plant under trust management. At the time, the uranium mines 
in northern Kazakhstan were producing some 100t U. Although production was due to rise to 600t/
y uranium ore (the maximum possible production from the northern deposits), for two years the 
Stepnogorsk complex could only work at full capacity for two months in a year. KazAtomProm 
worked out a plan to enable the plant to operate using ore supplied from southern deposits. 
However, because of the high estimated cost of implementing this project (USD 75 million), the 
company temporarily delayed any investment in it while it pursued its “corporate strategy to 
increase uranium production five-fold by 2010”. A year later, the company announced plans to 
invest over USD 180 million developing Stepnogorsk in 2005–2007.
In late February 2004, a new uranium refining plant was commissioned in Taukent in the Suzaksk 
Region of the South Kazakhstan Oblast. The project cost was USD 4.3 million, and plant capacity, 
1500-1700t/y U.
In August 2005, KazAtomProm declared that it intended to build a molybdenum ore processing 
plant in Stepnogorsk within three months. The plant was to produce 1,000 tonnes of molybdenum 
oxide a year. A Kazakh-British JV enterprise, Moliken, was set up to supply ore to the enterprise by 
developing the 21,000 tonne estimated deposit at Shorskoye. During 2005–2007, around USD 180 
million would be invested in the plant.
KazAtomProm has been very successful in leveraging finance from the banks in recent years. In 
June 2005, the company signed a three-year pre-export financing contract with a syndicate of 11 of 
the world’s largest banks (organized by Natexis Banques Populaires and Citibank) in the amount 
of USD 150 million. KazAtomProm intended to use these funds to finance geological exploration, 
mining and the production of natural uranium concentrate. In September the same year, a USD 
60 million pre-export loan was extended to KazAtomProm by Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd for a ten-
year period. Collateral for the loan was an export contract for the supply of uranium oxides (natural 
uranium concentrate) which had been struck with Itochu Corp.
KazAtomProm has been actively developing new deposits. In 2006, it commissioned the East 
Mynkuduk mine, which has a design capacity of 1000t/y U. In 2007, similar mines with on-site 
leaching facilities were due to be commissioned, as follows: Central Mynkuduk (2,000t/y), South 
Inkai (2,000t/y), Irkol (750t/y) and Kharasan (2,000t/y). In 2008, there are plans to begin ore 
extraction at West Mynkuduk (1,000t/y) and Budenkovskoye (1,000t/y). Kazakhstan’s total 
uranium resources amount to 900,000 tonnes, around 600,000t of which, according to estimates, 
can be extracted at the current level of commercial technology.
France boasts the world’s largest nuclear and energy complex and most up-to-date nuclear 
technology. In 2001, the French-Kazakh joint venture KatCo was founded (АRЕVА holds 51% and 
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KazAtomProm 49%) and will consist of an experimental uranium plant at the Moinkum deposit in 
South Kazakhstan. Development of the deposit will require investment of nearly USD 90 million 
which will be provided by the AREVA group. Reserves at Moinkum are estimated at 43,700t U.
Canada has a well-established uranium industry and is the largest uranium producer in the world. 
It made its first foray into the Kazakh market back in the 1990’s, but was initially unsuccessful. In 
1996, the Government of Kazakhstan and Canada’s World Wide Minerals signed a contract to take 
over the joint management of the Northern Uranium Production Plant and the Tselinny Mining and 
Chemical Combine. A year later, WWM applied to the Kazakh government for a license to sell uranium 
to the USA, but was refused, since there are strict quotas governing such imports into the USA. 
As a result, the company halted production, citing poor sales. The Kazakh government therefore 
took over the management of the complex and terminated the contract with WWM since the latter 
had failed to fulfil contract obligations. The government transferred the complex to KazAtomProm. 
WWM filed numerous suits with the US courts but all were dismissed. In February 2003, the US 
Supreme Court finally ruled in Kazakhstan’s favor. In March 2006, however, the company filed a 
suit with the International Arbitration Court, claiming USD 3.8 billion in compensation. Cameco, 
another Canadian company and one of the world’s largest uranium producers, was more successful 
in its business ventures in Kazakhstan. In 1998, it founded the Inkai joint venture KazAtomProm to 
develop uranium deposits in the Suzaksk Region of South Kazakhstan Oblast. 
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The USA is the largest investor in Kazakhstan’s economy overall. It accounts for more than one 
third of the direct investment in Kazakhstan since independence, amounting to USD 40 billion.12 
However, large-scale joint projects in the nuclear power industry between the US and Kazakhstan 
are currently limited to one joint venture involving KazAtomProm and the US Nuclear Energy 
Ministry. Based at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, the company refines scrap containing uranium into 
fuel pellets for nuclear power plants. The second stage of this project includes plans to increase 
capacity and revamp production of beryllium bronze alloy. The USA is represented in this project 
by Brush Wellman and RWE NUKEM, which invested USD 4 million. The US Government invested 
USD 1.5 million and provided consultants’ reports on the project. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant 
invested USD 4.5 million. Analysts expect this project to make profits of around USD 10 million per 
year.
In March 2004, the ground-breaking ceremony took place at the BN-350 liquid metal reactor 
coolant refinery. Project cost is estimated at USD 3 million which is being supplied in full by the US 
State Department in accordance with nuclear non-proliferation agreements. The plant will refine 
spent liquid-metal coolant into a concentrated alkaline solution. 
Japan’s influence will continue to grow in Kazakhstan in the years to come in terms of uranium 
recovery. Nuclear energy accounts for one third of the Japan’s energy complex, and the country has 
several leading nuclear industry enterprises.
In September 2005, Itochu Corp and KazAtomProm signed a ten-year, USD 60 million loan 
agreement under which the Kazakh company would supply Itochu with 3,000 tonnes of uranium 
concentrate. In January 2006, KazAtomProm concluded an agreement with Japanese companies 
Sumitomo Corporation and Kansai Electric Power Co. on the development of West Mynkuduk field. 
The Japanese partners will invest in the APPAK JV founded by KazAtomProm with KazAtomProm, 
Sumitomo and Kansai taking 65%, 25% and 10% shares respectively. This project is being financed 
with USD 100 million.
In May 2007, various contracts were agreed relating to the supply of uranium concentrate to Japan. 
In the longer term, Kazakh may begin exporting some 8,000 t/y uranium to Japan, which would be 
equivalent to 30% of total Japanese import market. The agreements also envisage the opening of 
a USD 500 million trade insurance credit line funded by Japan’s NEXI, and, in the medium term, the 
supply to NEXI of refined uranium products such as fuel pellets produced at the Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant. These agreements alone will double or triple the added value of uranium products made in 
Kazakhstan. 
Three months after the above agreements were concluded, KazAtomProm took the ambitious step 
of buying out Toshiba’s 10% share in Westinghouse Electric, the leading US producer of nuclear 
reactors, for USD 540 million. This transaction sealed a long-term alliance between KazAtomProm, 
Toshiba and Westinghouse Electric in the nuclear energy industry. 
For Kazakhstan, this step constitutes a major step forward in creating new opportunities to 
develop its hi-tech nuclear industry and increase its presence on western markets. Supplying 
processed uranium products to western markets is the Kazakh company’s top development 
priority alongside cooperation with Russia in the supply of Soviet-type reactors. The production 
of fuel for western reactors at Ulba Metallurgical Plant by the Cameco JV will be a major contribution 
to the Kazakh company’s goal of producing processed uranium fuel. It has stated that the first 
output will be available in 2012. 
South Korea is showing a keen interest in Kazakhstan’s nuclear complex. The two countries are 
exchanging scientific and technical expertise, and South Korea’s government has declared its 
interest in further cooperation with Kazakhstan.
China. No Kazakh-Chinese joint ventures have yet been founded in Kazakhstan, although Ulba 
Metallurgical Plant has a representative office in China. The Ulba-China JV company registered in 
12 The outcomes of the investment conference in California: USA is willing to and will develop cooperation with Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, September 15, 2005.
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the Waigaochao free trade zone near Shanghai in June 2004 to sell and market Ulba’s beryllium 
products in the Chinese market. In November 2004, KazAtomProm and China National Nuclear 
Corporation (CNNC) signed a long-term strategic partnership agreement and a program of works 
in the nuclear industry. Negotiations are under way relating to the co-development of the Zhalpak 
field in the southern part of Kazakhstan.
The low interest rates on credit extended to KazAtomProm are testament to the keen interest that 
overseas firms are showing in its uranium industry. The company has raised loans from Citibank at 
6.3%, from West LB loan at 7.7% and from Natexis Banques Populaires’s at 6.7%.13 
Prospects for Russian-Kazakh Cooperation amid Competition 
for Kazakh Uranium
In the first half of this decade, Kazakh uranium became a highly sought-after product, much 
scrutinized by the world’s leading uranium producers and consumers alike. This created an 
environment of intense competition, and has enabled Kazakhstan to be discerning in its choice of 
partners and investors. Nevertheless the country remained steadfast in its policy of diversifying 
its trade and economic relations in order to avoid dependency on any one partner, be it France, 
Russia or Japan.
Concurrent with this development, Russia, with its large production capacity and highly-competitive 
uranium refining technologies, had sought to restore its economic ties with Kazakhstan based on 
uranium recovery and the nuclear sector. Given its ambitious plans to develop nuclear energy, with 
an all but depleted uranium stock, it is very much in Russia’s interest to pursue cooperation with 
Kazakhstan. 
However, Russia will be competing in the uranium feedstock market with some highly 
accomplished competitors. As the cost of developing its own uranium deposits increases, and 
demand for nuclear fuel spirals as the role of nuclear energy expands globally, Russia will have 
to be resolute if it is to have influence in a strategically important region controlling a significant 
proportion of the world’s uranium stocks.
 Russia does have a number of competitive advantages which will favor Russian-Kazakh cooperation 
in the nuclear sector. 
• Both countries wish to further economic integration. They are members of EurAsEC, CSTO, SCO, 
CES and the CIS and are pursuing the creation of a customs union.
• The nuclear complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan complement each other: Kazakh uranium 
production feeds into Russian uranium enrichment; Kazakhstan produces elements and Russia 
fuel pellets. The joint development and construction of VBER-300 reactors is the logical completion 
of this vertically integrated nuclear production cycle. 
• Many leading Kazakh scientists, businessmen and researchers in the nuclear industry studied in 
Russian higher education institutions and maintain close relations with their Russian colleagues. 
Scientific exchange programs and traineeships have been established in Russia, which may favor 
the selection of Russian technologies and cooperation with Russian partners. 
Practical steps are being taken to launch an integration project in the nuclear sector. The 
foundations for this have been laid in the form of strategic partnerships already forged between 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan in the use of nuclear energy.
Russia’s moves to enhance the integration of the Russian and Kazakh economies along the whole 
nuclear production chain is a crucial step in its quest to resolve its own energy problems. The 
Kazakh economy will benefit similarly from cooperation with Russia. One further benefit of this 
cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan in the construction and operation of a nuclear power 
plant is that it may lead to a breakthrough in the machine building industry. 
13 KazAtomProm. Report for nine months of 2005. www.kase.kz 
20 E. Vinokurov “Nuclear Energy Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan: Prospects for Development and Cooperation”. © Eurasian Development Bank 
199–2005: Post-Crisis Cooperation
The first steps towards Russian-Kazakh nuclear cooperation were made after the collapse of their 
integrated economic systems in the late 1990’s. In 1998, the governments of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and Russian Federation signed agreement on the integration of nuclear fuel enterprises 
(Moscow, July 6, 1998). The main provision of the agreement was Russia’s purchase of a stake in 
Ulba Metallurgical Plant (as TVEL OJSC). 
After the break-up of USSR, the Ulba complex was the only link in the nuclear fuel production 
chain to be located outside Russia. The plant began producing uranium pellets to be used in the 
downstream assembly of reactor fuel elements (fuel cells). Fuel cells are produced in Russia at a 
plant close to Novosibirsk, and pellets are made in Kazakhstan by Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-
Kamenogorsk.
A joint venture to produce nuclear fuel for NPPs was one of the first projects founded since 2000 
by KazAtomProm. Its partners were TVEL (Russia) and EnergoAtom (Ukraine). The three companies 
took an equal share in the JV and its USD 0.45 million charter capital. The venture was aimed 
at integrating the entire nuclear production cycle in a single enterprise: uranium production and 
processing, fuel assembly production and nuclear energy generation. In early June 2001, the 
agreement establishing the JV was signed.
In May 2003, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed a further JV agreement on joint production 
of fuel assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors and the supply of nuclear fuel to Ukrainian NPPs. The 
agreement resulted in numerous orders for Ulba Metallurgical Plant and requests for it to produce 
nuclear fuel elements. Russia’s TVEL began producing fuel assemblies for Ukrainian NPPs and 
the National Nuclear Energy Company of Ukraine launched production of zirconium tubes for fuel 
assemblies. 
The Beryllium JV was another big project established in September 2002 by the Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant (UMP) and Moscow Non-Ferrous Metal Processing Plant (MZOTsM), each with a 50% share. 
The JV’s operations include the fabrication of ingots at UMP and the flat-rolling of these ingots at 
MZOTsM. These are widely used in hi-tech electronic instruments and in other specialist electronic 
components. The beryllium plant at Ulba signed contracts to supply Chinese consumers and made 
its first shipment to China. This UMP plant is the world’s second largest beryllium producer and 
performs the entire processing cycle from ore concentrate to beryllium metal and its alloys.
200: Economic Integration within Nuclear Cycle
Russian-Kazakh cooperation in the civilian use of nuclear energy gained momentum in 2006. On 
January 25 that year, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, and the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan 
Nazarbaev, made a joint declaration on cooperation in the non-military use of nuclear energy. The 
declaration launched a number of initiatives aimed at integrating the nuclear industrial enterprises 
of both countries. 
On July 25, 2006, MAEK-KazAtomProm held a meeting in the city of Aktau attended by Sergey 
Kiriyenko, the head of Russia’s Federal Nuclear Energy Agency. The meeting was called to discuss 
the strategic partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan on use of nuclear energy for non-military 
purposes. This program was the outcome of the joint statement made by Putin and Nazarbaev in 
January.
The program outlines six major areas of cooperation:
• Cooperation in nuclear fuel production;
• Cooperation in the nuclear energy industry;
• Development of transport infrastructure to deliver uranium products to the world market;
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• Improved regulation of Kazakh-Russian cooperation in the non-military use of nuclear energy;
• Scientific and technical cooperation;
• Cooperation in training personnel to work in the nuclear industry.
Under the program for strategic cooperation in nuclear fuel production, a memorandum of 
understanding was signed between KazAtomProm (Kazakhstan) and TekhSnabExport OJSC 
(Russia) establishing two joint ventures.14   
The first JV is established in Kazakhstan to produce natural uranium fuel for Russian-designed 
reactors. 
The second JV is established in Russia to enrich uranium. Subject to completion of feasibility studies 
the partner companies will contribute equally to the initial asset base for the joint ventures: 
- uranium production facilities will be provided by Kazakhstan; 
- uranium enrichment facilities will be provided by Russia.
At a meeting of the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan on October 3, 2006 in the city of Uralsk, 
it was agreed that Kazakhstan would participate in the introduction of a Russian initiative to 
establish, in Russia and under IAEA monitoring, an international nuclear fuel services centre, 
including uranium enrichment. On October 12, 2006, Russian and Kazakh representatives signed 
documents in Moscow establishing three Russian-Kazakh joint ventures in the non-military use of 
nuclear energy. On May 10, 2007, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia witnessed the signing 
of the agreement which established the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in the city 
of Angarsk. 
Under the program of strategic development of the nuclear energy industry, a third JV of is due to 
be established between KazAtomProm and AtomStroyExport. This JV will design a Russian-Kazakh 
nuclear reactor with VBER-300 power units designed by OKBM. The charter documents were signed 
in October 2006.
A revolutionary new 300 MW generating unit is also due to be built in Kazakhstan. Although 
reactors now commonly generate 1000 MW and more, these units are unsuitable for the extensive 
Kazakh grid because of the amount of reserve energy they require when the reactor is shut down 
for re-fuelling.
The new VBER-300 generator will be a key export opportunity for the Russian-Kazakh JV. Its principal 
design concepts were based on naval reactors which have accumulated over 6,000 reactor years 
of accident-free operation. 
The new reactor has no direct competitors, but this may change before long. The Japanese Atomic 
Energy Agency (JAEA), for example, has already completed the design concept for a 180 MW reactor. 
Also, the fast-breeder reactors designed in many countries will certainly be used well into the 
future (a 65 MW fast-breeder reactor designed with Russian assistance is due to be commissioned 
in China in 2008). 
On the whole, Kazakhstan is likely to select both 300 MW Russian-Kazakh reactors and, in 
the longer term, 1,000 MW Westinghouse reactors. 
14 http://www.KazAtomProm.kz/15000/?nc4&version=ru 
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(1) Uranium Mining
Uranium mining, refining and export are the major activities of KazAtomProm. In 2005 the company 
mined 4,032t U of the total 41,000t U mined globally. Around 19% of estimated global uranium 
stocks (900,000t) are in Kazakhstan. Over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium can be extracted using 
mineshaft leaching, the cheapest and least environmentally damaging form of extraction. 
The Ore Mining Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of KazAtomProm founded in 2004, extracts 
uranium using the method of mineshaft leaching at seven sites: Uvanas, Mynkuduk, South 
Moinkum, Kanzhugan, North Karamurun, South Karamurun, and Irkol. 
In 2005, Russia’s RosAtomProm mined 3,431t U, or 8% of global production. Its output comprised 
natural and converted uranium. Uranium mining in Russia has a much less certain future than in 
Kazakhstan. Deposits are exhausted in Russia, and if it is to expand its nuclear energy capacity, 
the way forward is based on Kazakh uranium supplies. 
(2) Uranium Enrichment  
Yellowcake (a chemical concentrate of natural uranium and an intermediate product) produced 
by the Ore Mining Company is refined at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and Stepnogorsk Mining and 
Chemical Combine.15 
Kazakh uranium mined by the Russian-Kazakh Zarechnoye JV will be enriched in a dedicated part 
of the Angarsk Electro-chemical Combine.
() Fabrication of Fuel Pellets and Fuel Elements
Ulba Metallurgical Plant, based in Ust-Kamenogorsk, is a leading producer of fuel pellets. 
US businesses have expressed interest in this strategic enterprise. As mentioned above, the US 
Nuclear Energy Ministry and some American companies invested in a joint venture which makes 
fuel pellets by refining scrap containing uranium. The capacity of the JV is due to be expanded, and 
production of beryllium bronze alloy will be added.16 
Russia’s TVEL, a world leader in nuclear fuel production, manufactures fuel assemblies (fuel 
elements). The Machine Building Works (Mashinostroitelny zavod) and Novosibirsk Chemical 
Concentrate Plant are Russia’s leading producers of fuel assemblies. Chepetsk Mechanical Plant 
and the Chemical Metallurgical Plant (Khimiko-metallurgicheskiy zavod) supply the construction 
materials, components and uranium products required by these companies.17 
(4) Small and Medium Power Reactors  
In October 2006, AtomStroyExport OJSC of Russia and KazAtomProm founded JV Nuclear Power 
Plants, a new joint stock company which will build small- and medium-capacity reactors. As 
yet, there is nothing to compete with this 300 MW reactor anywhere in the world. This project is 
currently in development. Designing a nuclear power plant which uses two VBER-300 reactors will 
take around three years and requires investment of USD 60-70 million, all of which will come from 
Kazakhstan. 
High-capacity plants capable of producing 1,000 MW and more do not represent an optimal 
decision for the Kazakh energy system. When such nuclear reactors are re-fueled, equivalent 
reserve capacity must be made available, and this is not possible given the huge distances between 
Kazakhstan’s power plants. It is more economical for Kazakhstan to commission three 300 MW 
plants rather than a single 1,000 MW one, thereby reducing its energy losses when capacity is idle. 
This also reduces power losses incurred in long-distance power distribution. 
15 http://www.KazAtomProm.kz/cgi-bin/index.cgi?p23&version=ru. 
16 Ligature is an additional alloy applied in metallurgy to add to liquid metal of alloying component.
17 Seventy-three energy reactors (17% of the world market) and 30 research reactors in 13 world countries operate with TVEL brand fuel. These include all reactors 
in Russian NPPs: RBMK-1000 (Leningrad, Kursk and Kalinin NPPs); VVER-1000 (Novovoronezhsk, Rostov, Balakovsk and Kalinin NPPs); VVER-440 (Kolsk and 
Novovoronezhsk NPPs); BN-600 (Beloyarsk NPP) and EGP- 6 (Bilibinsk NPP). As well as producing nuclear reactor fuel, TVEL supplies all Russian research reactors 
and nuclear icebreakers (Arktika, Rossiya, Taimyr, Sovetskiy Soyuz, Vaigach, Yamal, Sevmorput). 
2E. Vinokurov “Nuclear Energy Complexes in Russia and Kazakhstan:  Prospects for Development and Cooperation”. © Eurasian Development Bank 
It is likely that the first nuclear plant with a VBER reactor will be built in Aktau. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, Mangyshlak did have a BN-350 fast-neutron reactor and also has good 
staffing levels. Secondly, a nuclear project stands a better chance of recouping its costs in this 
region. Mangistau Oblast takes its power from a gas-fired HPP plant with a capacity of up to 500 
MW, which is rather expensive electricity for Kazakhstan. To make gas affordable, the government 
has set domestic gas prices five times below the market value. According to a KazAtomProm 
estimate, the construction of a 500 MW nuclear plant will cost USD 600 million and will pay for 
itself within five years. Our estimates run higher than that, probably closer to USD 1000 
million.
Resolving the domestic energy deficit is a matter of urgency. At the same time, VBER-300 is likely 
to prove attractive if promoted in world markets, primarily to large and under-populated countries. 
Market research conducted by RosAtom suggests that the world market can potentially absorb 
30-50 VBER-300s, creating revenue of USD 15-20 billion. The Russian-Kazakh JV stands a good 
chance of becoming the leader in small-capacity reactor segment if the project is implemented 
successfully.
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(5) NPP Construction
Russia. One of the primary goals of Russia’s FTP is “to speed up the development of the 
nuclear energy industry and provide geopolitical and energy security for Russian Federation by 
commissioning new generating units in nuclear power plants with a total capacity of over 2 GW a 
year…”.18  
The following activity is planned on this basis: 
- Two generating units with VVER-1000 reactors (Unit No. 2 at Rostov NPP and unit No. 4 at Kalinin 
NPP) will be commissioned in 2009 and 2011 respectively.
- In 2007–2008, three new generating units with VVER-1000 reactors will be constructed at 
Novovoronezhsk NPP #2 and Leningrad NPP #2. These will be ready for commissioning in 2012-
2013. From 2009 onwards, two new generators for NPPs with VVER reactors will be constructed 
annually; the completion of each will take five years.
Thus, upon completion of the program, ten new power units with a total power capacity of over 9.8 
GW will have been commissioned at nuclear power plants. A further ten generating units will be at 
various stages of completion. 
The program entitled “Transition to Innovative Technologies in Nuclear Energy Development” 
incorporates the following activity:
- generator #4 will be built at Beloyarsk NPP. This will have a BN-800 reactor which works using 
closed nuclear fuel cycle technology; the BN-800 unit will be supplied with MOX-fuel and is due to 
be commissioned in 2012.
The program requires investments totaling 1.47 trillion rubles (USD 55 billion), including 674.8 
billion rubles from the federal budget and 796.6 billion rubles from industry funds.
Kazakhstan. The first NPP with two generating units will be built at the MAEK site in Aktau. The 
first generating unit (300 MW out of a total 600 MW) is to be commissioned in 2014. Earlier there 
were plans for a second NPP at Ulken near Balkhash.19 However, the choice was made in favor of 
a coal-fired HPP.
() Nuclear Waste Disposal and Refinery
It is possible and indeed essential for countries to cooperate in the processing and disposal of 
nuclear waste. 
Cooperation between nuclear complexes in Kazakhstan and Russia along the entire 
nuclear energy production chain is necessitated both by the acute needs of both national 
economies and by the synergies which exist between their capacities and technological 
accomplishment at each stage of the nuclear fuel production cycle. These conclusions 
are borne out by national industrial development programs which focus on the complementarity 
and interdependence of the Kazakh and Russian nuclear complexes along the entire nuclear fuel 
production cycle.
18 FTP “The Development of Russia’s Nuclear Energy Industrial Complex 2007-2010 and Potential Future Development to 2015 “, p. 2 
19 Business i Vlast, 29.12.2006, p. 4
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The nuclear sector is dominated by state-owned companies. The nuclear energy complexes of 
Russia and Kazakhstan are state-owned; Kazakhstan’s uranium assets are concentrated in the 
hands of the state company, KazAtomProm, while Russia controls uranium, nuclear energy and 
scientific and research assets through RosAtom. Both countries regard the nuclear complex as 
being of extreme strategic importance and state funding is allocated accordingly. The nuclear 
industry is financed by the following:
• The national budget. Financing under Russia’s Federal Target Program may reach USD 55 billion. 
The federal budget is expected to provide 47% of this amount (USD 26 billion). Funds from 
the national budget will not be required after 2015 if the sector becomes self-financing, as 
expected. 
• State companies maintain their investment programs by raising commercial loans. Owing to 
the nature of its business and the state support it receives, nuclear holdings are able to raise 
long-term credit on relatively favorable terms. For example, in 2005 KazAtomProm received loans 
from Citibank at 6.3%, from West LB at 7.7% and from Natexis Banques Populaires at 6.7%.
• Joint ventures with leading international companies can help to shape capital structure and 
technological progress.
• Funding from international and national development banks. 
The financing of the nuclear energy industry by international and national development banks is 
of particular international interest. On the one hand, development banks can become one of the 
larges sources of financing for the sector (e. g., the World Bank has historically been the largest 
creditor of the hydro energy industry and has been allocating an average USD 1.25 billion to this 
sector annually for the last 60 years). On the other hand, there are obvious reasons why financing 
the nuclear industry represents a challenge: fear of nuclear accidents, the Chernobyl and Three 
Mile Island incidents in recent memory, nuclear waste issues, etc. However, public attitudes 
towards nuclear energy have been more positive in recent years. This has been encouraged by the 
growing energy deficit and relatively limited ecological impact of nuclear power plants (provided 
their safety is assured and waste issues are resolved). 
The scale and duration of nuclear energy projects (billions of dollars of financing 
required, with a 10 to 15-year investment horizon) make them a highly suitable investment 
opportunity for development banks. The innovative nature of the sector adds to their investment 
potential. As outlined above, the nuclear energy production cycle incorporates uranium production, 
enrichment, the production of fuel pellets and fuel elements, the construction of nuclear reactors 
and NPPs, the operation of these NPPs, and finally nuclear waste processing and disposal. The 
processing elements of the chain have obvious potential. Furthermore, a number of developing 
countries, especially those which export oil and gas, face a pressing need to diversify their national 
economies. Therefore, the development of the nuclear energy complex, including its high-tech 
elements, is especially attractive. This is particularly the case for Kazakhstan and Russia in view of 
the competitive advantages both countries enjoy in this sector. 
The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006 is committed 
to facilitating the sustainable economic growth of participating states and to expanding the trade 
and economic relations pursuant to its mission. The Bank offers long-term credit facilities to 
development projects in sectors prioritized by participating countries. Developing the innovative 
achievements of the nuclear energy complex and the hi-tech industries within it thus complies 
entirely with the mission of the EDB. The Bank regards the nuclear energy industry as one of its 
key priorities. 
One of the Bank’s first projects was a USD 60 Million loan to the Zarechnoye JV founded by 
KazAtomProm and TekhSnabExport to develop the Zarechnoye uranium deposit in South 
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Kazakhstan. The opportunities for integration represented by projects which bring 
together the nuclear energy complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan add to their suitability 
as investment targets for the EBD. The Bank is currently reviewing other projects undertaken 
by post-Soviet countries which also offer significant potential to expand mutual trade and 
investments. 
The Bank has certain competitive advantages in relation to nuclear sector projects:
• The nuclear sector is a strategic one for the Bank’s member countries and these countries 
therefore limit the amount of foreign equity that may be invested in it. The EBD offers borrowers 
long-term and relatively cheap loans (interest rates are commensurate with western financial 
institutions and below those of CIS banks). 
• The Bank offers considerable political support to member states. 
• There is minimal attendant political risk for borrowers working with the EBD. 
The development strategies being applied within the nuclear complexes of Russia and Kazakhstan 
and the integration agreements between them can be facilitated by the Bank and the financing it 
is able to extend to all stages of nuclear technology cycle. 
VEB (Russian Development Bank) and the Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK) have yet to 
participate in the development of this sector. However, the charter and other regulatory documents 
of these national development banks do not exclude their involvement in the nuclear energy 
industry. In fact, given the close interaction of the national development banks and relevant state 
entities, and the Banks’ role in enhancing the efficacy of targeted programs, both these financial 
institutions are expected to focus on the development of the nuclear energy complex. This is 
further corroborated by recent events: RosAtom and GasPromBank have opened discussions on 
the establishment of a large nuclear machine-building holding based on the AtomStroyExport CJSC 
(which builds NPPs overseas). RosAtom will own 51% of this enterprise and GasPromBank 49%. 
The holding will integrate the entire production process from nuclear plant design to supply of 
equipment. It will be co-owned by RosAtom, GasPromBank and the State Development Bank. VEB 
will hold 10-15% of the equity.20 
Generally, the current status and the future requirements of the Kazakh and Russian economies 
will rely on the economically viable development of nuclear energy complexes and on close 
cooperation between the two countries. The development of this capital- intensive sector requires 
generous funding from a number of sources. In order to secure long-term credit facilities from 
international and national development banks, the electricity industry must be efficient, and the 
nuclear energy complex must remain innovative and diversified while offering opportunities for 
greater integration. 
20 Kommersant, 06.11.2007 
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